IN THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION NO. _____
THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA,
JOHN STREET, sued in his official :
capacity as Mayor of the City of :
Philadelphia, and JOSEPH MARTZ, sued :
in his official capacity as Managing :
Director of the City of Philadelphia, :
MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
Plaintiff International Action Center (IAC) has applied for a permit to hold a 48 hour vigil outside City Hall, at Dilworth Plaza, in opposition to the impending execution of Mumia Abu-Jamal. Supported by International Concerned Friends and Family of Mumia Abu-Jamal and the Free Mumia Coalition, the IAC plans to rally those persons who are outraged by the wrongful conviction of Mr. Abu-Jamal and who want to express their views that the state must stop its efforts to put Mr. Abu-Jamal to death, that it is committing a human rights violation of the greatest magnitude. Plaintiff’s rally will also commemorate and protest the 16th anniversary of the killing of women, men, and children in the MOVE bombing of May 13, 1985 by Philadelphia authorities.
The very entity whom the IAC challenges in this political protest, the City of Philadelphia, has determined that it will not allow the IAC to engage in round-the-clock vigiling. Further, it has truncated the hours that it will allow the IAC to engage in expressive activity at Dilworth Plaza.
The City has failed to promulgate standards or narrowly tailored regulations to govern the grant and denial of permits, and its determination restricting the IAC’s ability to engage in constitutionally protected activities are arbitrary and based on the unbridled discretion of the City’s decisionmakers. The City is discriminatorily restricting the political activities of plaintiff, towards whom the City has obvious political disagreement and animosity, while having previously granted to a favored political group, the Republican Party, permission to use the same public space without similar restrictions.
It has done so in contravention of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and in violation of the Permanent Injunction issued against defendants in Pledge of Resistance v. We the People 200, Inc., CA 87-3975 (1988).
I. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Prevail on the Merits
A. The City of Philadelphia Is Violating the Pledge of Resistance Permanent Injunction by Which it is Bound
Plaintiff IAC is seeking to assemble in an around-the-clock 48-hour vigil on the public plaza immediately adjacent to Philadelphia’s City Hall, a location abutting the seat of city government, and notably, abutting the location at which Mr. Abu-Jamal was wrongfully convicted. The IAC plans to engage in quintessentially public speech and political protest to oppose the putting to death of Mr. Abu-Jamal.
By operation of the Permanent Injunction entered in Pledge of Resistance, v. We the People 200, Inc., defendants are permanently enjoined from preventing, “individuals or groups from... assembling...on streets, sidewalks, parks or other areas open to the public, so long as such activities do not involve breaches of the peace, and do not actually interfere with similar activity by others, or with public events then in progress.” 
The City of Philadelphia is placing greater restrictions on the IAC’s use of this public space, known as Dilworth Plaza, than it has placed on other favored permittees who have been granted use of Dilworth Plaza. It is doing so in the absence of any standards or regulations to reign in its administrators’ and officers’ unfettered discretion and discriminatory impulses.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the critical importance of access to public space for the purpose of engaging in freedom of expression:
“[T]he streets and parks...have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for the purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.” Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)
B. The City of Philadelphia Employs a Licensing Scheme for Constitutionally Protected Speech that is Facially Invalid and Lacks Adequate Procedural and Substantive Safeguards as Required by the First Amendment
The City of Philadelphia requires that any entity who seeks to assemble and occupy, march or proceed along any street must apply for and receive a written permit, unless that entity is affiliated with the military, fire, or police forces, or is part of funeral procession. §12-1109 [Permits Required for Parades, Processions and Assemblages]. There is no similar requirement in Philadelphia’s code for assemblages in public spaces that are not on streets. Assemblies are governed by the Pledge of Resistance Order.
Nowhere in either the code, nor in any Executive Order, does the city promulgate permit procedures or regulations regarding or encompassing entities who may wish to engage in vigiling, demonstrations, or other First Amendment protected activities. The City has by Executive Order effective May 1, 1993, required that entities wishing to hold “special events,” must apply for a “special events” permit 75 days prior to the first day of the event. By practice not codified, the City requires that entities who wish to engage in constitutionally protected activities such as demonstrations or assemblies be subject to the “special events” application process and requirements. As discussed below, the Special Events Policy cannot by intention or practice constitutionally apply to First Amendment protected activities. However, the government has required that plaintiff seek permission for such activity by filling out a “special events” application.
By requiring this licensing scheme, by which the government grants or denies permission to engage in protected speech, the City of Philadelphia has effected prior restraints on speech.
[Requiring a permit] before authorizing public speaking, parades, or assemblies in ‘the archetype of a traditional public forum,’ Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988), is a prior restraint on speech, see Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-151 (1969); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951). Although there is a ‘heavy presumption’ against the validity of a prior restraint, Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963), the Court has recognized that government, in order to regulate competing uses of public forums, may impose a permit requirement on those wishing to hold a march, parade, or rally, see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941). Such a scheme, however, must meet certain constitutional requirements. It may not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official. See Freedman v. Maryland, supra. Further, any permit scheme controlling the time, place, and manner of speech must not be based on the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must leave open amply alternatives for communication. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992).
While requiring plaintiff to apply for a permit, the City of Philadelphia has failed to promulgate any time, place or manner regulations and has thus delegated standardless discretion to its licensing authorities who, further, have granted and denied permits and access to public property on content based, non-neutral terms. Time, place and manner restrictions are allowed only where there are narrowly tailored standards that accommodate coordination among competing use of public forums and that are sufficiently binding on government to prevent an arbitrary or discriminatory exercise of discretion. See, Forsyth County, 505 U.S. 123.
The presence of written and codified rules and ordinances assures uniform applicability and prevents the instinctive impulse of decisionmakers to grant more favorable terms and conditions (and less restrictions) to more favored political groups and entities.
I. The City’s Licensing Scheme Allows for Unbridled Discretion and Provides No Affirmative Regulations
The process by which the City of Philadelphia has vested authority in itself to determine whether or not to grant such permits is constitutionally untenable. There are no regulations governing restrictions on activities, there are no rules, no standards promulgated. There are no reasonable time, place or manner restrictions. Even to the extent that the City is attempting to regulate expressive activity under its Special Events Policy, that Executive Order provides, in part, “Section I. Rules and Regulations. The committee may establish rules and regulations for the use of public property. Such rules and regulations shall become effective following the procedure set forth in the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, and shall be enforced as regulations of the City.” No such rules have been promulgated.
The Policy further states, “Time Restrictions. The Committee may place reasonable time restrictions on the issuance of special events permits, including without limitation a prior notice requirement, first-come, first-served scheduling, limitations on frequency of use, and limitation of permits to normal operating hours for City property.” Putting aside whether such restrictions, including frequency of use and normal operating hour restrictions, would be constitutionally permitted when applied to First Amendment protected activity, no such restrictions or regulations have been promulgated.
The City’s failure to provide standards, instead allowing the Committee to exercise its discretion within these generalized categories, cannot withstand constitutional review. The Supreme Court has long held unspecific grants of authority to be unconstitutional. For example, in the context of a standardless sound amplification ordinance, the Supreme Court held that such a standardless law is:
“unconstitutional on its face, for it establishes a previous restraint on the right of free speech in violation of the First Amendment which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against State action. To use a loud-speaker or amplifier one has to get a permit from the Chief of Police. There are not standards prescribed for the exercise of his discretion. The statute is not narrowly drawn to regulate the hours or places of use of loud-speakers, or the volume of sound (the decibels) to which they must be adjusted. The ordinance therefore has all the vices of the ones which we struck down [previously]. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1948)
Finally, the Special Events Policy details in a separate section, only six enumerated circumstances where the Special Events Committee may deny or revoke a special event permit, none of which were referenced or cited for the denial of the permit to engage in expressive activity.
The City has failed to promulgate standards that guide both applicants and the licensing decisionmakers. Applicants are entitled to know what activities the government will allow or disallow so that they may plan accordingly, and so that they may challenge regulations they believe are unconstitutional restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly. Decisionmakers require clear standards to bind their discretion and eliminate prejudice (whether conscious or unconscious) in the granting of permits. As the Court in Shuttlesworth noted, “a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license” must contain “narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority.” Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,150-151 (1969).
The Supreme Court has specified for more than a half-century the dangers and unconstitutional nature of the failure to promulgate standards in relation to access to public space:
“[T]his Court [has] condemned statutes and ordinances which required that permits be obtained from local officials as a prerequisite to the use of public places, on the grounds that a license requirement constituted a prior restraint on freedom of speech, press and religion, and, in the absence of narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for the officials to follow, must be invalid. [citation omitted] In the instant case we are met with no ordinance or statute regulating or prohibiting the use of the park; all that is here is an amorphous ‘practice,’ whereby all authority to grant permits for the use of the park is in the Park Commissioner and the City Council. No standards appear anywhere; no narrowly drawn limitations; nor circumscribing of this absolute power; no substantial interest of the community to be served. It is clear that all that has been said about the invalidity of such limitless discretion must be equally applicable here.”
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-72 (1951)
“[T]he absence of express standards makes it difficult to distinguish, ‘as applied,’ between a licensor’s legitimate denial of a permit and its illegitimate abuse of censorial power. Standards provide the guideposts that check the licensor and allow courts quickly and easily to determine whether the licensor is discriminating against disfavored speech. Without these guideposts, post hoc rationalizations by the licensing official and the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for courts to determine in any particular case whether the licensor is permitting favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expression....In sum, without standards to fetter the licensor’s discretion, the difficulties of proof and the case-by-case nature of ‘as applied’ challenges render the licensor’s action in large measure effectively unreviewable.” Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. 486 U.S. 750, 758-59 (1988)
“Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect....Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328 (1963). See, also, Gannett Satellite Information Network v. Berger, 894 F.2d 61 (3rd Cir. 1990)(regulation facially invalid where it fails to set forth standards by which authority is to exercise discretion and provides no affirmative guidelines)
In the instant case, on April 2, 2001, defendant notified plaintiff IAC verbally that it was going to deny a permit for the 48 hour vigil, but would grant a 24 hour vigil including overnight use. Plaintiff attempted to contest and discuss this decision with defendants who were unwilling to provide any rationale for their decisions. Thereafter the IAC was called to a meeting on April 26, 2001 in Philadelphia and informed that it would not be allowed to hold an overnight vigil at all over the period of May 11-13, 2001. At no point has the City ever provided such denial in writing, nor has it ever pointed to any authority for its denial. It simply called in the plaintiff’s representatives and denied/revoked their vigiling permit. It also restricted the other hours that the IAC could engage in expressive activity on Dilworth Plaza.
The only rationalizations provided to date for the denial of vigiling at Dilworth Plaza is that the City claims it has not previously granted overnight use permits, and that the City has unspecified concerns about pigeon excrement at city hall. No written explanations exist as a basis for the denial.
ii. The City’s Licensing Scheme Places No Restrictions on the Time Frame for Granting or Denying Permits and No Obligations to Provide Written Explanation
The City’s permit scheme provides no procedural safeguards with regard to the granting of permits or notice of denial. In addition to the failure to promulgate narrowly tailored rules for the granting or denial of permits, the City has failed to place limitations on the time in which determinations must be made and fails to require that explanation of denials be made in writing.
“Our cases addressing prior restraints have identified two evils that will not be tolerated in such schemes. First, a scheme that places ‘unbridles discretion in the hands of a government official or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may result in censorship.’... Second, a prior restraint that fails to place limits on the time within which the decisionmaker must issue the license is impermissible..... Where the licensor has unlimited time within which to issue a license, the risk of arbitrary suppression is as great as the provision of unbridled discretion. A scheme that fails to set reasonable time limits on the decisionmaker creates the risk of indefinitely suppressing permissible speech.” FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-27 (1990) [citations omitted]
By not requiring a time frame within which to provide information, the City hinders applicants from organizing and should they organize, it puts them at risk for sudden cancellation.
C. The Special Events Permitting Process Through Which Defendants Required Plaintiff to Apply for the Right to Engage in Expressive Activity Does Not and Can Not Apply to First Amendment Protected Activity
The Special Events permitting process to which defendants direct those wishing to engage in expressive activity, explicitly states that its purpose is not merely to coordinate events but to “recapture some of the high costs of staging such events.” See Special Events Policy Overview.
The Policy Overview requires that anyone wishing to engage in expressive activity on public space apply for a permit at least 75 days in advance. (See Policy Overview), and submit a $20.00 check. If the “sponsor” of the special event wishes to obtain a permit for activity less than 75 days in advance, then the policy states that the applicant must pay a $25.00 late fee.
It states that the “Special Events Review Committee will review the application and determine whether to approve the event based on pre-set criteria set forth in Mayor’s Executive Order No.6-93.” As discussed above, the Mayor’s Executive Order fails to set forth clear standards or criteria for decisionmaking regarding time, place, or manner restrictions.
The Policy further orders that, “If approved, the Committee will present the sponsor with a list of requirements that must be met prior to the event. This may include security and sanitation requirements, EMS services, reimbursement for City costs and fees, property rental fees, and insurance and bonding requirements. At least 10 days before the event, the sponsor must post a bond or cashier’s check in the amount of the estimated cost of City services and other sums due the city for the event.”
Additionally, the City requires that permittees “reimburse the City for all personnel costs expanded for the event over and above normal City staffing levels [which include] Police, public health, sanitation, and Department of Public Property personnel....For example, if the Police Department normally has two officers in the area where an event will be held, but must assign five officers to the area because of the event, the sponsor must pay the cost of the additional three officers.”
The only exception made for reimbursement of costs is if the applicant is a tax exempt organization or community group with 35 or more City residents that earns no profit and if it contributes 90% or more of its gross revenues to a Public Interest Organization; or if “certain sponsors” “prov[e] to the Special Events Committee’s satisfaction that they are truly unable to pay those fees.” See Special Events Policy Overview.
Defendants may not place such costs on those wishing to engage in constitutionally protected speech. These restrictions cannot even begin to pass constitutional muster. See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
In the instant case, the City also demanded that the IAC secure a one million dollar insurance certificate, naming the City as an insured, in order to be allowed to engage in expressive activity. The IAC did so. See attached insurance certificate. Thereafter, even though the IAC complied with this onerous burden, the City determined that it would deny the IAC the right to engage in vigiling.
It is apparent from this Special Events Policy as a whole that it was not, and could not have been intended to encompass First Amendment protected activity. It was intended to encompass festivals, parades, the circus coming to town, and the like. This is evident from its incompatibility with the nature of spontaneous First Amendment protected activity (given its 75 day restrictions), and with the costs it seeks to assess on applicants. The stated purpose of recapturing of costs cannot be related to demonstrations. The requirement that a group of persons secure insurance before they may speak is flatly unconstitutional.
Setting aside, arguendo, the intended purpose of this Policy, it is quite apparently inappropriate when applied to First Amendment activity regardless of the intent of promulgators. If the promulgators indeed did intend for this policy to encompass First Amendment protected speech, it fails nevertheless and is unconstitutional on its face.
Because this Policy is so clearly incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment, plaintiff presumes that it cannot have been intended to encompass First Amendment protected activity. However, even if it were intended to encompass constitutionally protected activity, it fails because of that clear incompatibility.
Nonetheless, by practice, the City is obligating those wishing to engage in expressive activities, including plaintiff, to submit to the terms and conditions imposed within this unconstitutional “special events” structure which are then discretionarily enforced by the City’s decisionmakers.
D. The Defendants Never Identified Any Restrictions Encompassed by the Special Events Policy As a Basis for Denying Plaintiff’s Request to Vigil, and Further there is No Bar on Encampment for Vigiling in the Special Events Policy
There are no restrictions specific to the use of Dilworth Plaza delineated in the Special Events Policy. There are no restrictions on vigiling or encampments delineated in the Special Events Policy.
On the evening of May 4, 2001, the Defendants provided to plaintiff for the first time what purports to be restrictions on the use of Dilworth Plaza. These restrictions, which were described as “a draft of the standard park rules for outdoor events” are titled “Dilworth Plaza Rules” with the word “DRAFT” stamped across the top. [see attachment] These new restrictions, have not been applied to other favored permittees. These restrictions bar plaintiff from, inter alia, erecting anything upon the premises, yet other permittees, including the RNC and its corporate sponsor Wawa, have been allowed to erect structures, including tents.
The restrictions and their discretionary application fall squarely into those practices, ordinances and regulations that have been repeatedly struck down as unconstitutional. See Saia 334 U.S. 558; Forsyth County, 505 U.S. 123; Niemotko v. Maryland 340 U.S. 268.
E. The City Has Unconstitutionally Applied its Discretion to Make Content Based Determinations
The City of Philadelphia has engaged, and continues to engage, in content based determinations when granting access to public space. In this instance it has imposed greater restrictions on the IAC with regard to Dilworth Plaza than it has placed on other favored permittees, including the Republican National Convention.
In October of 1999, the RNC was granted a permit for the full use of Dilworth Plaza, and additionally virtually every public space in the entire city for eleven days, with no restrictions save one: that it not use any part of the venues for unlawful purposes or bring an article onto the venue which may be dangerous (unless safeguarded), a nuisance, or which would void insurance.
The RNC was allowed to erect structures, including tents, at Dilworth Plaza and other locations elsewhere so long as it had prior consent of the City, and the RNC was also allowed to park vehicles on venues throughout the city with the City’s prior consent. The RNC was allowed to prepare and serve food at Dilworth Plaza yet the City has indicated it will restrict the IAC’s ability to provide food to the demonstration participants.
The City also exempted the RNC from paying for costs as claimed to be required by its Special Events Policy.
Plaintiffs IAC should be treated the same as the favored applicants, the RNC. They do not seek the entirely of public space in Philadelphia, but merely a fraction of what was granted to the RNC. For that fraction, they are entitled to use of the plaza with no greater restrictions than those that were imposed on the RNC, or any and all other favored permittees.
“[A] law or policy permitting communication in a certain manner for some but not for others raises the specter of content and viewpoint censorship. This danger is at its zenith when the determination of who may speak and who may not is left to the unbridled discretion of a government official....[W]e have often and uniformly held that such statutes or policies impose censorship on the public or the press, and hence are unconstitutional, because without standards governing the exercise of discretion, a government official may decide who may speak and who may not based upon the content of the speech or viewpoint of the speaker. Therefore, even if the government may constitutionally impose content-neutral prohibitions on a particular manner of speech, it may not condition that speech on obtaining a license or permit from a government official in that official’s boundless discretion.”
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. 486 U.S. 750, 763-64 (1988)
[A]ppropriate, limited, discretion, under properly drawn statutes or ordinances, concerning the time, place, duration, or manner of use of the streets for public assemblies may be vested in administrative officials, provided that such limited discretion is ‘exercised with “uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of each application, free from improper or inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination”...[and with] a “systematic, consistent and just order of treatment.”’” [citations omitted] Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
The Court need not reach the issue of whether any proffered restrictions are reasonable in all contexts, or whether they would be unreasonable if codified and applied in a uniform fashion. The restrictions placed by defendants upon plaintiff are unreasonable because they are not specifically promulgated, they are discretionarily applied, and they serve solely to obstruct plaintiffs use and are not applied to favored political groups or other favored permit applicants.
F. Defendants Should Be Estopped From Putting Forth Any New Rationale Now, or Any Rationale Not Clearly Delineated at or Before the Time of the Denial as the Basis for the Permit Denial
Defendants have indicated to plaintiff that the sole reasons for the revocation/denial of the 48 hour vigil permit are that the Defendants had never granted overnight use before, and that it had concerns about pigeon excrement at Dilworth Plaza. It was unwilling to provide any further explanation, or to engage in discussion regarding these matters, and summarily told plaintiff’s representatives that the decision was made. Both of these excuses are unsound and unsupportable. Defendants have indeed granted overnight use of Dilworth Plaza to others, including the RNC and including initially to the IAC for a 24-hour period. The RNC was granted unrestricted use 24 hours a day for a period of ten days, including periods of time when City Hall was in session.
The concerns about pigeon excrement defy understanding or logic. The IAC offered to discuss any such concerns with the defendant and sought to understand what the concerns were in the hope that they could be ameliorated, but defendant refused to provide explanation or have such discussions, indicating the pretextual nature of this excuse. The City’s expressed concern that the presence of pigeon excrement will pose an unspecified health hazard, is belied by the fact that these concerns were unapparent when the City allowed the RNC and its corporate sponsor Wawa to erect at Dilworth Plaza 6,700 foot hoagie as well as dispense 20,000 “junior hoagies” which, according to Wawa, would stretch five times the height of the Sears tower if laid end to end. This massive amount of food was served to thousands of people at Dilworth Plaza along with chips, pretzels, cake, water and soda, surely gaining the attention of the attendant pigeon population..
Because of the City’s chosen failure to provide any written explanation for its decision making denial, nor to point to any regulation or code that prohibits the use as requested by permit, it should be estopped from now creating rationale it was unwilling or unable to previously provide. Any post hoc rationalizations are fundamentally suspect. No post hoc rationalization could possibly have been the basis of a decision already committed. The only relevant factors are those that form the basis of the decision at the time of the decision. Defendants cannot be allowed, due to their own intentional lack of standards and procedures, to determine ex post facto rationale.
III. Plaintiff Will Suffered Irreparable Harm
The violation of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights meets the standard required for preliminary relief. The Supreme Court has stated that, “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitute irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-374 (1976). See also In Re school Asbestos Litigation, 842 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff and its supporters have invested substantial time and expense in organizing for this vigil. It has made plans and stated an intention, as have many expected participants, to vigil and demonstrate at Dilworth Plaza. The defendants now threaten the participants with arrest and deprivation of their liberty by denying their right to assemble. The IAC intends for this to be a peaceful, expressive and law abiding vigil. They are adversely affected when the government falsely asserts that they and their supporters may not participate in vigiling as planned, and with the implicit threat of police action.
IV. Harm to Defendants or the Public Generally
There is no question that there is no harm posed to defendants or to the public generally from plaintiff’s request for permits to engage in First Amendment protected activities at Dilworth Plaza. The public would be well served by the relief requested herein. This conduct by the Philadelphia authorities, in the instant case, and through its discretionary permitting practice for protected activities in general, creates a chill on, and obstructs, organizing efforts by all persons who wish to engage in freedom of expression and who are not favored by defendants.
The Supreme Court recognizes the significance and value of robust demonstrations. “[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.” Terminello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
For the foregoing reasons, and any others that may appear to be just to this Honorable Court, plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction should be granted.
Mara Verheyden-Hilliard, Esq.
Partnership for Civil Justice, Inc.
1901 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20006
Stefan Presser, Esq.
PA Attorney No. 43067
American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania
125 South Ninth St., Suite 701
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 592-1513, ext. 116
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
 The Order further states that it is not to be “construed to prevent the defendant, in the proper performance of their respective duties, from (1) ensuring the safety and security of government officials and members of the public; and (2) from enforcing the criminal and other laws and regulations of the City of Philadelphia, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the United States of America; or (3) from barring unreasonable interference with, or disruption of, ceremonies and staged events.” Defendants have at no time asserted that the basis for their denial was any of these exceptions, nor have they identified any law or regulation as forming the basis of their decision.